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1 Introduction
There is a widespread skepticism about the effectiveness of foreign aid in
improving the well beings of the recipient countries. Therefore, donor
countries often impose conditionalities in granting foreign aid. Condition-
alitiestake various forms such as conditionalities on the use of foreign aid,
i.e.,tying aid to specific projects, and conditionalities on economic policies
of the recipient country including trade policies. This paper considers the
question of whether imposing conditionality improves the efficacy of
foreign aid. The effects of a conditionality of project tying, in particular,
tying of aid to infrastructure, on the recipient country's welfare is going to
be analyzed.
Indeed, developing countries rely heavily on foreign aid to finance
investments in infrastructures such as transport, power, water, sanitation,
telecommunications and irrigation, which are indispensable for achieving
economic development. According to World Bank (1994), investment in
infrastructures amounts to $200 billion a year (4% of GDP) of which
nearly $24 billion or about 12% of total resource for infrastructure
investment is provided by foreign aid. A distinct feature of infrastructures
is their public good characteristics. In this paper, we formalize infrastruc-
tures as public inputs that are non-traded intermediate goods. Infrastruc-
tures are to be financed by foreign aid and tariffrevenues.
There are a large number of literatures analyzing welfare effects of
aid for donor and recipient countries in international economics. Foreign
aid defined as public resource transfers from the rich to the poor countries,
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is assumed in the literature to be distributed in a lump-sum fashion and
granted without any conditionality. Possibilities of transfer paradox has
been discussed highlighting the effects of transfer on changes in terms of
trade. The worsening of the recipient's terms of trade through transfers is
primarily responsible for the paradoxical result of donor enrichment and
recipient impoverishment.
There are some exceptions that analyzed the effects of aid with
conditionalities. For example, conditionality of tying aid to consumption
good is analyzed in Kemp and Kojima (1985), tying aid to public goods
expenditure in Hatzipanayotou and Michael (1996, a), tying aid to envi-
ronmental project in Chao and Yu (1999), tying aid to poverty alleviation
project in Svensson (2000). The conditionality on trade policies to reduce
tariffsis discussed in Lahiri and Raimondos-M^ller (1995). The condi-
tionality of tying aid to public input project as in our paper is analyzed in
Hatzipanayotou and Michael (1996, b). This paper departs from Hatzi-
panayotou and Michael (1996, b) by considering a small open economy as
opposed to a large country and by introducing tariffsas a partial source of
government revenue to finance public inputs. Tariffs are introduced not
only because they are one of the most important source of government
revenue in developing countries, but also because Lindahl taxes may be
infeasible in equilibrium.0 Hatzipanayotou and Michael (1996) showed
that aid tied to public inputs could cause a transfer paradox due to the
terms of trade effect. This paper, instead, argues that even in the absence
of the terms of tade effect, aid tied to public inputs can cause, what Yano
and Nugent (1999) called, 'the small country transfer paradox'.
We analyze the welfare effects of untied and tied aid in the context of
a small-open economy, in which public inputs are financed by tariff
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revenue and foreign aid. The rest of the paper is organized as follows.
Section 2 presents a model in which a small country receives untied aid
and aid tied to public input projects. Section 3 presents the equilibrium of
the model. The welfare effects of untied and tied aid are analyzed in
Section 4. Concluding remarks are contained in Section 5.
2 Model
Consider an aid-recipient country producing two final goods, 1 and 2, and
public inputs. The economy is endowed with two primary factors of
production, labor L and capital %. Two final goods are produced by
using labor, capital,and public inputs. Public inputs are non-traded inter-
mediate goods which possess public good characteristics.The government
produces public inputs by using labor and capital as inputs. Let commod-
ity 1 be the aid-recipient's export good and commodity 2 be the import
good. The price of commodity 1 is chosen to be the numeraire and its
price is normalized to unity. The economy is assumed to be a small open
economy so that the two final goods are traded at exogenously given
international prices. Perfect competition prevails in goods and factors
markets.
The technology available to the economy is given by the following
production functions.
X, =Ft(tf,G), i = 1,2 (1)
where X{ denotes the final goods' output, uf = (L, K) denotes the vector
of private factors of production with L, and Kt being the amounts of labor
and capital used in the production of good /, and G denotes the amount
of the public input. F, is assumed to be linearly homogeneous and
concave in vf, and increasing in G. Public inputs are thus pure public
goods in the sense that production process can be replicated without
increasing G.2)
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The production function of the public input is
G = Fg (v9) (2)
where v9 ―(Lg, Kg) indicates the vector of private inputs used in the
production of public inputs, and Fg is assumed to be linearly homogene-
ous and concave in vg. The government produces public inputs competi-
tively.
We define the GNP function R(p,vp) to be the maximum value of
traded goods (=Xi + pX2) evaluated at the domestic price p. Since import
tarifft is imposed on good 2, p = q2 + t, where q2 is the international
price of good 2. Since the price of good 1 is normalized to 1, only the
domestic price of good 2 enters the argument. Perfectly competitive factor
market leads us to the marginal-productivity-pricing-rule, i.e.,each factor
is paid the value of its marginal product.
w = Rvp(p,vp) (3)
where R P = -^-, w = (w, r) is the vector of factor returns, w and r are
dv
the factor prices of labor and capital respectively.
Let C9(w) be the unit cost function for the public input production.
The constant returns to scale technology for public input production gives
us C9 to be positively homogeneous of degree one and concave in factor
prices. The government's demand for private factors of production is
given by
v9 = C^G (4)
where C≪ = ^r is the factor demand vector per unit of G.
Full employment is achieved,
vp + v9 = V (5)
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where V = (L, X) is the exogenously given factor endowments vector.
Substituting (4) into (5), we can write the full employment condition as
vp + C^G = V. Hence, by solving for if
vp = vp(p,G) (6)
It now becomes a function of p and G alone. Following Abe (1992), we
define the restricted GNP function, /?(･),as
R(p,vp(p,G)) = R(p,G) (7)
where we have used equation (6). /?(･) is equipped with the following
properties: i) positively homogeneous of degree one in p, ii) concave in p,
and iii) Rp = dR/dp = X2.3) Equation (6) along with equation (3) allow
us to rewrite the cost function for public inputs as well.
Cfi(w) = C9(R^ (p,vp (p,G))) = C*9(p,G) (8)
Let E(p,u) be the minimum expenditure required to attain the
welfare level u at given price p;v(p,E(p,u)) = u. The minimum expen-
diture function E(-) is equipped with the following properties; i) posi-
tively homogeneous of degree one in price, ii) concave in p, and iii)
Ep = dE I dp = c2, where c2 is the consumption of good 2.
2.1 Foreign Aid and the Equilibrium in a Small Open Economy
The economy receives foreign aid transfer T which is measured in terms
of commodity 2. The transfer may take a form of either tied aid, i.e.,aid
tied to the provision of public inputs, or untied aid which is distributed to
the consumer in a lump-sum fashion. Let (3,(0 < (3 < 1) be the proportion
of the aid transfer tied to public input project.
We can write the national income/expenditure identity as
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E(p,u) = R(p,G) + t(Ep(p,u)-Rp(p,G)) + (l-l3)T (9)
where the second term on the right hand side represents the tariffrevenue,
and the third term represents the untied aid transfer.
The costs of public inputs are financed by the tariffrevenue and the
tied aid. The budget constraint for the government is given by
C'g(p,G)G = t(Ep(p,u)-Rp(p,G)) + (3T (10)
where we have used equation (8). Notice that the public inputs are not
financed by Lindahl taxes. It has been shown in Manning, Markusen and
McMillan (1985) that when public inputs are pure public goods, Lindahl
taxes incur losses to the producers and as a result no public input is
produced in equilibrium. Due to the infeasibility of Lindahl taxes, tariff
revenue and foreign aid are chosen to be the alternative sources of the
government revenue.
The above system of equations reduces to two equations (9) and (10)
which contain two endogenous variables u and G and two exogenous
variables T and t.In order to proceed the welfare analysis of foreign aid,
we totally differentiate equations (9) and (10), and obtain
~E0(l-tm) -Rg +tRpg 1 du





M-GCp*9 + tMp 0 j [dT
where Eo is the inverse of the marginal utility of income and Epu =
dEp /du, m denotes the marginal propensity to consume the imported
commodity such that Epu =^-E0 = mE0, M denotes imports where
M = Ep(p,u)- Rp(p,G), and Mp = Epp - Rpp. It has been shown by
Bhagwati and Kemp4) that (1 - tm) > 0 is the condition necessary for
―134－
international commodity markets to be stable when the terms of trade are
given. We also adopt this condition here.








dG D I Eotm EQ(＼ -tm)＼
tMp l-p＼ dt
M-GCp*9 + tMp (3
＼
dT
D =EQ(l- tm)(C*9 + tRpg + GC*g9) + Eo tm(Rg - tRpg)
In order to evaluate the welfare effects of aid, it is useful to note a
few properties of the model.
1. The model has the decomposition property, i.e., changes in factor
endowments do not alter factor prices. This is well known as the
factor price equalization in the conventional Hecksher-Ohlin frame-
work (with or without public inputs). In this model, w and r are
determined solely by the prices and do not depend on G and factor
endowments. Hence, we have Cgg = 0.
2. The effect of an increase in G on the government's net revenue is
captured by the term - (C*9 + tRpg + GCg*9) = - (C*9 + tRpg). An
increase in the level of G has two effects on the government budget
constraint. One is the direct effect on the government expenditure-
that the government incurs an additional cost of C*9. The other is
the indirect effect on the government budget constraint through the
changes in the level of tariffrevenues. An increase in G affects the
domestic production of the imported good and reduces the tariff
revenue by tRpg. Using the fact that Rpg = ^f > 0, the indirect cost
of G is positive.
3. The Samuelson-Kaizuka-Sandomo condition evaluated at the inter-
national prices is captured by the term Rg - tRpg. Kaizuka (1965)
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and Sandmo (1972) showed the Pareto optimal condition pertaining
to public input provision to be the sum of the marginal rate of
substitution between public input and labor be equal to the marginal





where FL = %"- and FG = §K We refer to this condition as the
Samuelson-Kaizuka-Sandmo condition. In the absence of market
distortions, providing public inputs according to the Samuelson-
Kaizuka-Sandmo condition is necessary for achieving Pareto
optimality.
Simple calculation yields
Rg - tRpg = (FG +pF2G -Gg)- tF2G = F? + qFG - C*g
FG F2G C*9
where w* is the wage rate associated with the international price q.
If the Samuelson-Kaizuka-Sandmo condition evaluated at the inter-
national price is satisfied,we have Rg - tRpg = 0.
In the presence of tariffs,however, the Samuelson-Kaizuka-
Sandmo condition no longer describes the Pareto-optimal condition
for public input provision. Due to the distortionary effects of tariffs,
the Samuelson-Kaizuka-Sandmo condition may result in excess- or
under-supply of public inputs.5) Since the sign of Rg ― tRpg is
essential to the welfare analysis of the aid transfer, we present the
following definition.
Definition 1 The Samuelson-Kaizuka-Sandmo condition evaluated
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at the international prices is said to over-estimate the cost of public
inputs if Rg ―tRpg < 0, and under-estimate the cost if public inputs
ifRg -tRpg>0.
3 Welfare Effects of Foreign Aid: Tied vs. Untied Aid
In this section, we examine the effect of an aid-transfer on the welfare of





- (3)(C*9 + tRp) + (3{Rg - tRpg)] (14)
Recall that (3 denotes the proportion of an aid transfer tied to finance
the cost of public input. Consider the case where aid is completely untied,
i.e.,(3 = 0. Equation (14) becomes
f
= F(c"+O (15)
The changes in the level of untied aid affects welfare through the changes
in government's revenue, thus depends on the sign of D alone.
Now, consider the other case where aid is completely tied to public
input project, such that (3=1. Equation (14) reduces to
|=F(H--flw
(16)
Analyzing the welfare effects of tied aid is equivalent to analyzing the
welfare change due to an increase in G, which depends on whether the
marginal benefit of public input (the marginal rate of substitution between
public input and private input) exceeds its marginal cost. The welfare
analysis of tied aid, thus, revolves around the sign of Rg - tRpg, i.e., the
Samuelson-Kaizuka-Sandmo condition as well as the sign of D. We can
present the following.
Proposition 1 Foreign aid, both tied and untied, benefits the recipient
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country if the Samuelson-Kaizuka-Sandmo condition evaluated at the
international prices under-estimates the cost of public inputs. If the
Samuelson-Kaizuka-Sandmo condition evaluated at the international
prices over-estimates the cost of public inputs, it is possible for both
untied and tied aid to impoverish the recipient country.
If the Samuelson-Kaizuka-Sandmo condition evaluated at the international
prices over-estimates the cost of public inputs and if public inputs are in
excess supply, an additional aid, tied or untied, further increases the level
of public input and leads to welfare deterioration. If public inputs are
under-supplied, the Samuelson-Kaizuka-Sandmo condition evaluated at the
international prices under-estimates the cost, and an additional aid both
tied and untied improves welfare.
By comparing the welfare effects of untied aid with that of tied aid
more closely, we can observe the following.
Proposition 2
1. Suppose D > 0. Untied aid benefits the recipient country while tied
aid impoverishes the recipient country, if the Samuelson-Kaizuka-
Sandmo condition evaluated at the international prices over-
estimates the cost of public inputs.
2. Suppose D < 0. Tied aid benefits the recipient country while untied
aid impoverishes the recipient country, if the Samuelson-Kaizuka-
Sandmo condition evaluated at the international prices over-
estimates the cost of public inputs.
Suppose the Samuelson-Kaizuka-Sandmo condition evaluated at the
international prices slightly over-estimates the cost of public inputs such
that D > 0, untied aid benefits the recipient country while tied aid harms
the recipient country. This confirms the common belief that untied aid is
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superior to tied aid. However, if the Samuelson-Kaizuka-Sandmo condi-
tion evaluated at the international prices significantly over-estimates the
cost of public inputs such that D < 0, untied aid harms the recipient
country while tied aid benefits the recipient country. Furthermore, if the
Samuelson-Kaizuka-Sandmo condition evaluated at the international prices
under-estimates the cost of public inputs, tied and untied aid have the
same welfare effects; whether tied or untied, an increase in aid improves
recipient's welfare.
The result also indicates that transfer paradox can occur even in a
small open economy. Earlier works on transfer paradox in the interna-
tional trade literature used a large country model and showed that the
terms of trade effect was responsible for the paradox. Transfer paradox
can occur in a small open economy without the terms of trade effect due
to the market distortions created by the non-optimal provision of public
inputs. The result of this paper is related to the work of Yano and
Nugent (1999) in the sense that the presence of the non-traded sector
gives rise to the possibility of transfer paradox. In their work, the over-
expansion of non-traded goods sector lead to the transfer paradox. In the
presence of public inputs, which are non-traded goods, worsening the
excess-supply of public inputs gives rise to the welfare deterioration.
4 Conclusion
This paper presented a model of a small open economy with public inputs
and analyzed the welfare effects of aid tied to public input projects as
well as untied aid. We identified the conditions under which untied aid is
superior (or inferior) to tied aid and the conditions under which both
untied and tied aid are beneficial to the recipient country (Proposition 1).
From Proposition 2, we can conclude that imposing conditionality of tying
aid to public inputs does not necessarily improve efficacy of foreign aid.
The results also imply that possibilitiesof transfer paradox differ between
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the case of untied aid and that of tied aid.
As a concluding remark, it should be noted that our result depends
crucially on the decomposition property of the model. Khan (1983)
showed that as the numbers of factors and commodities vary, the factor
price equalization may no longer be achieved. In the absence of factor
price equalization, our conclusion needs to be modified. Another restric-
tion of the model is that the analysis was confined to the 'atmosphere
type' public inputs that are pure public goods. The classes of public inputs
that falls into the category of impure public goods were beyond our scope
of the paper, which does not mean that they are less important.
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